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misrepresentations, whether intentional or negligent, of the
police officer and the misstatements of the informer whom the
police officer justifiably and in good faith believed to be telling
the truth. In the latter instance, the evidence would be admis-
sible, while in the former it would not. Support is given to this
distinction by Mapp v. Ohio,24 which established the principle
that the purpose of the fourth amendment is to prevent unrea-
sonable police behavior and not improper activity on the part
of private citizens.
If this distinction is accepted, the problem then becomes
one of determining when to allow an inquiry into the factual
veracity of the affidavit. Considering the divergent policy con-
siderations, 25 a proper answer might be to require that a con-
tradictory hearing be held only after the defendant has made an
initial showing creating a strong suspicion that there has been
intentional or negligent misrepresentations by the police of-
ficer, affiant.26
Randolph W. Hunter
AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULES OF FORM AND PAROL EVIDENCE
. Offeror signed an agreement to purchase several lots, but
the offeree's signature did not appear in the agreement; how-
ever, his name was typed above offeror's signature. The deposit
stipulated in the written agreement was accepted by offeree.
Later, offeree delivered title to one of the lots described in the
agreement which was accepted by offeror. Offeror sued for the
balance on deposit, asserting that the agreement was not legally
binding because it was never accepted in writing. The trial
court held that the agreement was valid. In affirming, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a contract to sell immovables
which lacks the offeree's signature, the acceptance can be proved
by some unequivocal act showing the offeree's assent to the
offer.1 Alley v. New Homes Promotion, Inc., 247 So.2d 218 (4th
Cir.) writs refused, 258 La. 972, 248 So.2d 832 (1971).
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. The public interest, in insuring that the facts alleged in the affidavit
are actually true, conflicts with the equally important interest of protecting
the anonymity of the informer and insuring a speedy criminal process.
26. See note 8 supra.
1. It is recognized that the issue concerning the formal requirements
in the instant case was not critical to the decision since the court found
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NOTES
The Civil Code requires generally that all transfers of im-
movable property be in writing,2 and specifically, that sales of
immovables be made by authentic act or by a writing under
private signature3 Although article 2440 clearly states the for-
malities necessary in sales, article 2462 requires only "a writing"
to establish a valid promise to sell.4 Despite this difference in
language, it appears that the "writing" required for valid prom-
ises to sell must conform to the necessary formalities of sales.
Until article 2462 was amended in 1910, it expressly required
that promises to sell meet the formalities necessary for sales; 5
however, the Louisiana supreme court has held that this amend-
ment did not change the original intent of the article with regard
to form.6 Thus, the law requires that both sales and promises
to sell be made by authentic act or be a writing under private
signature. The only requirement of a writing under private sig-
nature is that both parties sign the instrument containing the
terms of the agreement.7
Parol evidence is inadmissible against or beyond what is
that there was no formal tender of title within the stipulated time. The
court's treatment of the formalities required to effectively express assent
is taken as a starting point for a study of the legislation and jurisprudence
in this area. This note is confined to a discussion of private transactions.
The formalities of judicial sales are largely provided in statutes outside the
Code and are strictly applied. In State ex rel. Hinton v. Justice, 248 So.2d
861 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), the court held that even though the constitu-
tional peremptive period had elapsed, the omission of the tax collector's
signature on the deed rendered the tax sale invalid. In Lepine v. Marrero,
3 Orl. App. 379 (La. App. 1904), aff'd, 116 La. 941, 41 So. 216 (1906), this rigid
enforcement of formal requirements was rejected in private transactions.
2. LA. Crv. CODs art. 2275: "Every transfer of immovable property must
be in writing . .. .
3. Id. art. 2440: "All sales of immovable property shall be made by
authentic act or under private signature.
"Except as provided in article 2275, every verbal sale of immovables
shall be null, as well for third persons as for the contracting parties them-
selves, and the testimonial proof of it shall not be admitted."
4. Id. art. 2462: "A promise to sell . . . which, if it relates to immov-
ables, is in writing, so far amounts to a sale, as to give either party the
right to enforce specific performance of same."
5. Id. Prior to amendment, the article stated: "To have its effect, either
between the contracting parties or with regard to other persons, the prom-
ise to sell must be vested with the same formalities, as are above prescribed
in articles 2439 and 2440 concerning sales, in all cases where the law directs
that the sale be committed to writing." La. Civ. Code art. 2437 (1825) and
La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. VII, art. 9 are essentially identical.
6. Oeschner v. Keller, 134 La. 1098, 64 So. 921 (1914).
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2241: "It is not necessary that those acts be written
by the contracting parties, provided they be signed by them." Id. art. 2235:
"An act which is not authentic . . . avails as a private writing, if it be
signed by the parties."
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contained in an instrument transferring an immovable.8 Since
identical formalities are required in both sales and promises to
sell, the exclusion of parol evidence should apply in both in-
stances. Thus, under the Code, if one party does not express
assent to the contract by his signature, parol evidence is inad-
missible to prove this assent.
Despite these specific requirements, the courts have found
valid contracts transferring immovable property in forms which
do not meet the codal stipulations. Although requiring that
promises to sell must have the same form as sales, the juris-
prudence indicates that neither promises to sell9 nor sales10 need
be made by authentic act or by a writing under private signa-
ture." The courts require that the agreement be in writing,12
but it appears that no rigid form is necessary.13 Acts of sale,14
deeds, 8 written receipts for the price paid for land, 6 written
8. Id. art. 2276: "Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or
beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been said
before, or at the time of making them, or since."
9. Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940); Joseph v. Moreno,
2 La. 460 (1831).
10. Guice v. Mason, 156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924); Bradford's Heirs v.
Brown, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 217 (La. 1822); Neblett v. Placid Oil Co., 257 So.2d
167 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
11. The fact that a third person is affected by the contract does not
change the court's treatment of the case. See Lepine v. Marrero, 3 Orl.
App. 39 (La. App. 1904), aff'd, 116 La. 941, 41 So. 216 (1906), and cases cited
therein.
12. Ceromi v. Harris, 187 La. 701, 175 So. 462 (1937); Linder v. Cotonio,
175 La. 352, 143 So. 286 (1932); Rubenstein v. Files, 146 La. 727, 84 So. 33(1920); Oeschner v. Keller, 134 La. 1098, 64 So. 921 (1914); Williams v. Alex-
ander, 193 So.2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Jackson v. Dominick, 166 So.
867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
13. Although the signatures of both parties are not required, the cases
support the assertion that at least one party's signature is essential. Pierce
v. Griffin, 95 So.2d 190 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), indicated that a writing
sufficient to transfer immovables could be found on a wooden marker stake
on which the vendor had written, "[lin 1963 this lot 4 sold to .... ." The
writer's signature did not appear. The case was actually decided on an
admission of the transfer under oath. The writer has found no other case
that would support the theory that neither party's signature is required on
the writing.
14. Davis Bros. Lumber Co. v. Smitherman, 156 La. 607, 100 So. 785
(1924); Saunders v. Bolden, 155 La. 136, 98 So. 867 (1924); Balch v. Young,
23 La. Ann. 272 (1871); Madison v. Zabriskie, 11 La. 247 (1837); Crocker v.
Nuley, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 583 (La. 1825); Baudin v. Roliff, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 165 (La.
1823); Cinquimani v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 5 Pit. 290 (La. App. 1922).
15. Dobbins v. Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So.2d 26 (1945); Beard v. Nunn,
172 La. 155, 133 So. 429 (1931); Industrial Lumber Co. v. Rogers, 158 La.
557, 104 So. 367 (1925); Savage v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 134 La. 627, 64 So. 491(1914); Lepine v. Marrero, 116 La. 941, 41 So. 216 (1906); Allen v. Whetstone,
35 La. Ann. 846 (1883); Stanley v. Addison, 8 La. 207 (1835); Bradford's
Heirs v. Brown, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 217 (La. 1822); Neblett v. Placid Oil Co.,
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offers to sell,17 promissory notes,18 and letters acknowledging
co-ownership 19 have all been considered sufficient to effect a
valid transfer of land without the written assent of both parties.
The most important observation drawn from the jurisprudence
is that in all the cases where a valid writing has been found,
this writing always bears the signature of the party asserting
the invalidity of the contract.2 0
It has also been required that the party who does not evi-
dence written assent exhibit some outward manifestation of
assent beyond oral acceptance in order to make a binding con-
tract.21 Taking possession of the land,22 recording a written
offer,23 paying the price,24 subsequently assigning the land,25
257 So.2d 167 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Jenkins v. Dykes, 91 So.2d 416 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1956); Franks v. Scott, 191 So. 175 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
16. Kinchen v. Redmond, 156 La. 418, 100 So. 607 (1924); Guice v. Mason,
156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924); Cousin v. Schmidt, 143 La. 843, 79 So. 427
(1918); Barfleld v. Saunders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906); Hitchcock v.
Harris, 1 La. 311 (1830); Richards v. Nolan, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 336 (La. 1825).
17. Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940); Joseph v. Moreno,
2 La. 460 (1831).
18. Rachal v. Normand, 6 Rob. 88 (La. 1843).
19. Da Ponte v. Ogden, 161 La. 378, 108 So. 777 (1926); Bair v. Abrams,
12 La. Ann. 753 (1857); Barrett v. His Creditors, 12 Rob. 474 (La. 1846).
20. See Caire v. Sullivan, 162 So.2d 49 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), wherein
plaintiff sued to be recognized as owner of certain lands. The defendant
alleged that plaintiff's ancestors in title had sold his interest In the land to
defendant. The only written evidence was a carbon copy of a transfer made
and introduced into evidence by the defendant. This writing bore no writ-
ten assent of the alleged vendor, the plaintiff's ancestor in title. The court
held that there had been no valid transfer. Thus, It seems that one party
cannot bind another by producing a writing of his own making which bears
no evidence of the other party's assent. This case is distinguishable from
the Instant case because the party asserting the invalidity of the contract
had not expressed his written assent.
21. Savage v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 134 La. 627, 64 So. 491 (1914) (payment
of the price and assignment of the deed cures the failure of the grantee
to sign the deed); Miller v. Douville, 45 La. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893)
(written offer to sell is valid without vendee's written acceptance, but ven-
dee must express assent before revocation of the offer). See also Jenkins
v. Dykes, 91 So.2d 416 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956). Accord, Herriot v. Broussard,
4 Mart.(N.S.) 260 (La. 1826), wherein the court noted that since the non-
signing party did not evidence his assent to the agreement by sufficient
acts, such as payment, there was no valid contract.
22. Kinchen v. Redmond, 156 La. 418, 100 So. 607 (1924); Guice v. Mason,
156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924); Saunders v. Bolden, 155 La. 136, 98 So. 867
(1924); Lepine v. Marrero, 116 La. 941, 41 So. 216 (1906); Crocker v. Nuley,
3 Mart.(N.S.) 583 (La. 1825); Pierce v. Griffin, 95 So.2d 190 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957); Franks v. Scott, 191 So. 175 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939); Cinquimanl
v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 5 Pit. 290 (La. App. 1922).
23. Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940); Savage v. Wyatt
Lumber Co., 134 La. 627, 64 So. 491 (1914). In these cases an affidavit
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and other equivalent acts28 have all been held sufficient to rem-
edy the absence of written assent. Parol evidence is of course
necessary to show this manifestation of assent, and the courts
have been liberal in allowing its use.27
The instant case is in accord with the jurisprudence. The
offeree was asserting that the contract was valid. The defense
raised by the offeror was that the agreement could not have
legal effect because the writing lacked an essential formality,
the signatures of both parties. However, the offeror had evi-
denced his assent to the agreement by his signature.28 His
assertion that the contract was invalid was based on the fact
that the offeree had not signed. Thus this case was consistent
with the prior cases in that the party asserting the invalidity of
the contract for lack of form had given his own written assent.,"
The court stated that promises to sell must contain the same
formalities as sales. However, written assent of both parties
was not required. Since parol evidence showed that the offeree
had exhibited sufficient acts to evidence his assent, the contract
was held valid.
In the instant case the court did not articulate the reasons
certifying the offeree's acceptance was recorded with the written offer.
This seems to weaken these cases as authority for the proposition.
24. Beard v. Nunn, 172 La. 155, 133 So. 429 (1931); Industrial Lumber
Co. v. Rogers, 158 La. 557, 104 So. 367 (1925); Davis Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Smitherman, 156 La. 607, 100 So. 785 (1924); Savage v. Wyatt Lumber Co.,
134 La. 627, 64 So. 491 (1914). See Stanley v. Addison, 8 La. 207 (1835),
wherein the court stated that when the deed acknowledged receipt of the
price, the vendee had discharged his obligation and thus his written accep-
tance was not necessary. See also Crocker v. Nuley, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 583 (La.
1825); Jenkins v. Dykes, 91 So.2d 416 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
25. Saunders v. Bolden, 155 La. 136, 98 So. 867 (1924); Baudin v. Roliff,
1 Mart.(N.S.) 165 (La. 1823). In Bradford's Heirs v. Brown, 11 Mart.(O.S.)
217 (La. 1822), the court stated that one who has carried his pollicitation
into effect cannot urge that the offeree did not accept the offer when the
offeree has passed the thing to another. See also Neblett v. Placid Oil Co.,
257 So.2d 167 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
26. Dobbins v. Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So.2d 26 (1945) (accepting pay-
ments under a unitization agreement); Balch v. Young, 23 La. Ann. 272
(1871) (acceptance can be shown other than by written evidence, e.g., by
the offeree availing himself of the stipulation of the contract or by anything
clearly indicating an acceptance); Franks v. Scott, 191 So. 175 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1939) (paying taxes).
27. Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940); Da Ponte v. Ogden,
161 La. 378, 108 So. 777 (1926); Cousin v. Schmidt, 143 La. 843, 79 So. 427
(1918); Balch v. Young, 23 La. Ann. 272 (1871); Bradford's Heirs v. Brown,
11 Mart.(O.S.) 217 (La. 1822); Jenkins v. Dykes, 91 So.2d 416 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1956).
28. Cf. Caire v. Sullivan, 162 So.2d 49 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) at note
20 supra.
29. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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behind its decision to find a valid contract in a writing that
clearly did not satisfy the codal requirements, but the leading
case of Bradford's Heirs v. Brown8° was explicit in this regard.
Plaintiffs sued to be recognized owners of certain lands. They
alleged that a transfer deed was invalid because it did not ex-
hibit the vendee's signature and that parol evidence could not
be used to supplement the faulty deed. The court allowed the
use of parol evidence and held for the vendee, stating:
"[A]ssent of the vendee... cannot be denied by the vendor,
because he is estopped by his deed from denying what he
has solemnly admitted therein, [and vendee's] assent may
be proved by matter aliunde . . .. 3
Thus, where the facts reveal that a party who has given his
written assent to a contract later asserts that the agreement is
invalid for lack of the other party's written assent, the court
considers him estopped to assert this lack of formality.
The estoppel created by the jurisprudence seems equitable
even though it violates the legislation concerning form and parol
evidence.8 2 These particular provisions are not rules of public
order,8" but rather, are rules of evidence established to defeat
fraudulent claims based on easily fabricated oral testimony.
In situations like the instant case, deviation from the codal re-
quirements creates no danger of fraud; the party who is con-
testing the validity of the contract has given his express written
assent to the agreement. Therefore, the judgment is not based
entirely on testimony, but is founded on reliable written evi-
dence emanating from the party who asserts the invalidity.
Further, the party whose signature is lacking has demonstrated
30. 11 Mart.(.S.) 217 (La. 1822).
31. Id. at 220.
32. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2275, 2276, 2440, 2462.
33. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 285 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959);
2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE nos. 1106, 1355 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959);
1 AUBRY & RAU, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 306 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1965). See
1 S. LrrVNOFF, OBUGATIONS § 341 (1969) for an explanation of solemn and
evidentiary formalities. This distinction was recognized early in Packwood
v. Dorsey, 6 Rob. 329 (La. 1844). LA. Civ. CODE art. 2275 allows for a valid
transfer of immovable property by a confession under oath, without any
writing, thus lending support to the assertion that the provisions in ques-
tion are not rules of public order.
34. 2 PLANIOL, CvL LAW TREATISE nos. 1106, 1355 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959); 1 AUBRY & RAu, CIvIL LAw TREATIsE no. 306 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1965).
35. 2 PLANIOL, CIvIL LAw TRATIsE no. 1125 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
1973]
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his unequivocal assent to the proposition by substantial acts. To
invalidate the agreement because of an alleged lack of consent
on his part would be an unnecessary inequity.
The fact that other jurisdictions reach identical results in
similar situations is a persuasive indication that the Louisiana
courts have sound reasons for developing a narrow exception
to the rules of form and parol evidence. The French Civil Code
provides basically the same rules governing form and parol
evidence as the Louisiana Civil Code.8  In addition, the French
code expressly provides for the situation in Alley through the
concept of "commencement of proof."83 Even though formal
requirements are not met, the agreement is given legal effect if
there exists a writing signed by the person against whom the
contract is alleged. In common law jurisdictions the Statute
of Frauds provides that a transfer of land is valid if there exists
a writing signed by the party charged with the contract.8
Influenced by equitable considerations, the Louisiana courts
have consistently found valid contracts transferring immovable
property based upon evidence that violates the codal provisions
36. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1341 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1942): "An act
before a notary or under private signature must be made of all obligations
. . . exceeding one-hundred fifty francs in sum or value; and no parol evi-
dence shall be admitted against or beyond what is contained in the acts
t.. " In France, the signatures of both parties are essential for a valid
act under private signature. 2 PLANIOL, CivIL LAW TREATISE no. 58 (La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1959).
37. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1347: "The above rules are subject to excep-
tion when there is a beginning of proof in writing.
"This term denotes any written act which emanates from him against
whom the demand is made . . . and which renders probable the facts al-
leged." The La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. IV, art. 244(2), provided a simi-
lar commencement of proof which allowed parol evidence. Without com-
ment in the Projet, this article was excluded from the 1825 Code. Specula-
tion that tacit continuation of this article is the basis for the court's deci-
sions is clearly dispelled by the jurisprudence which has held that there is
no beginning of proof in Louisiana since the adoption of the 1825 code.
See Ackerman v. Peters, 113 La. 156, 36 So. 923 (1904); Wright-Blodgett Co.
v. Elms, 106 La. 150, 30 So. 311 (1902); Patterson v. Bloss, 4 La. 374 (1832).
38. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1932); "The following classes of in-
formal contracts are by statute unenforceable unless there is a written
memorandum thereof signed by the party against whom enforcement of
the contract is sought .... " Id. § 207: "A memorandum, in order to make
enforceable a contract within the Statute, may be any document ... signed
by the party to be charged . . . ." This writer has not found that Louisiana
courts have adopted the Statute of Frauds in resolving these cases. How-
ever, an identical result would be reached under the Statute of Frauds since
all the writings which are valid in Louisiana Jurisprudence would satisfy
the Statute. It should be noted that the Louisiana jurisprudence reveals




of form and parol evidence. The courts have not explicitly
delimited this narrow exception, but it appears that there must
be a writing signed by the party who alleges that the contract
is invalid for lack of form; and that the non-signing party must
have manifested his assent to the contract by unequivocal acts.
As long as the application of this doctrine is confined to sit-
uations like Alley, no danger of fraud is likely, and the possible
harsh results which would result from rigid enforcement of for-
malities are averted. Given this consistent approach by Louisi-
ana courts, it is expected that this concept will be applied in
future cases.
William A. Jones, Jr.
THE LIMITS OF "PUBLIC INTEREST"
Plaintiff sued for allegedly defamatory statements pub-
lished by defendant in a magazine article on electronic eaves-
dropping. The article stated that plaintiff had persuaded a de-
tective previously hired by her husband to "sell out" and work
for her in connection with her ensuing divorce action. Defen-
dant urged that the New York Times v. Sullivan' doctrine denied
recovery to a "public official" or a "public figure" for a defama-
tory statement concerning them unless it was made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether the statement was false or not. ' 2 The trial court
found the doctrine inapplicable because plaintiff was neither a
"public official" nor a "public figure." The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and held the New York Times doctrine
applied to defamatory statements concerning private individuals
involved in matters "of public or general interest."3 Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972).
At common law, defamation is a false statement of fact
which tends to hold a person up to "public contempt, ridicule, or
shame."' 4 In order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 280.
3. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971).
4. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 154, 71 N.E. 739,
742 (1904); see also Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ. Corp., 242 N.Y.
208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926); Bennet v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 230 N.Y.
125, 129 N.E. 343 (1920). The same concept is worded somewhat differently
in RESTATEMENT O TORTS § 559 (1938): "A communication is defamatory if it
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him In the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."
19731
